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I. OUR RISK REGULATION STORY
In Chapter XXVIII of Jules Verne’s Around the World in Eighty Days, the train driver,
egged on by enthusiastic US passengers and despite objections by Passepartout, reverses
his train to cross a wobbly bridge (successfully) at high speed. With all passengers on
board. It is a favourite chapter of ours and one which comes in handy in risk management
classes. Passepartout did not suggest that the driver not try to cross the bridge. Rather, he
wanted to minimise risk exposure to the passengers. Why put the whole train at risk if the
passengers could disembark and the driver could later carry out the tricky manoeuvre?
(The passengers could walk around the gorge.)
In classes we use this chapter as an example of the different approach in risk management
between the EU (Passepartout; he’s French) and the US (the train driver, conductor and
most of the passengers are North Americans). In the end, both the Europeans and the
Americans tend to cross the bridge. Yet they often have a different route to get there.
Neither of the authors can claim that when we read Around the World… as children,
we dreamed of a career in the study of risk. Our interest in risk arose initially as a result of
our background in trade law (in the case of ﬁrst author) and general EU law and policy
(second author). Representing a client in the biotech sector, we were asked in the mid
1990s to monitor and advise on the evolving EU regulatory landscape for biotechnology.
One fairly quickly realises that unless one can call upon the talents and skills of a
multidisciplinary team, it is very challenging truly to appreciate the detail of risk
identiﬁcation, management and communication.
II. THE PAST AND THE PRESENT OF RISK RESEARCH
At the time when we entered the risk arena, risk research was very unifocal. One zoomed
in on a particular technology, and one assessed the approach to its risk in various
jurisdictions across the world, often – especially of course if one was a practitioner –with
a view to evaluating the impact on marketability. We were, of course, aware of the
impact of the precautionary principle as an overall risk management principle in the EU.
Yet most of us failed to look beyond the regulator’s take on risk analysis, and into
the psyche of the society in which the regulator operated. This approach was often
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also reactive. Even if one acted “upstream” in order to try and inﬂuence the law, one was
nevertheless responding to an announced or mooted risk management measure.
This approach changed with the introduction of “new” technologies such as
nanotechnology, synthetic biology and the like. Having run behind the facts, both the
business and the NGO communities now look to regulate a technology proactively:
business has no interest in spending lots of funds on research and development on a
particular technology, if it turns out that society has no taste for it. Self-fulﬁlling
prophecies are an inherent risk in this respect. A regulator’s legal regime for a new
technology in and of itself may turn consumers away from it, for they assume that where
there is smoke, there is ﬁre. It is crucial therefore for industry to be in charge of the
narrative from the moment of conception of the technology. In turn this, of course,
obliges NGOs to ensure that the narrative takes on board any public health, safety or
environmental concerns which the technology triggers.
III. THE FUTURE OF RISK RESEARCH
The current societal debate points to a number of issues which, in our view, will, could
and /or should dominate the immediate research agenda of the risk management community.
1. The ‘post-truth’ and post-expert era
This is better described, we would suggest, as the era of lies and dismissal of informed
opinion. Especially in jurisdictions where the executive has a large impact on the action
of regulatory agencies (including the United States), politicians responding in knee-jerk
fashion to the popular mood will inevitably impact on risk management. Both the
academic and the expert community face a persistent struggle in the near future to return
the debate to informed decision-making.
2. Challenges for international harmonisation
Further trade integration requires regulatory co-operation. That is not a new insight.
Anyone who half decently looked into “Trade ands” issues in the 1990s came to that
conclusion. The recent turbulence, however, hitting such attempts at further
harmonisation (TTIP and CETA chieﬂy among them) suggest that we have a long way
to go in assisting with the levelling of the playing ﬁeld required by international trade.
Particularly since we, rightly, have to ensure that the playing ﬁeld is levelled at a height
which satisﬁes jurisdictions with high standards of protection in consumer law,
environmental law etc.
Working out an acceptable method of international harmonisation or co-operation,
which respects different approaches to risk management whilst ruling out protectionism,
is an important ask for the scholarly and political community alike. Without it, we might
see a retreat into further localism which is not always justiﬁed or desirable.
3. The innovation principle and principles generally
This, we believe, will be a crucial theme for future research. Innovations often present
regulators with challenges they have not yet encountered, particularly with regard to
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unforeseen risks and harm. This is reﬂected in the existing body of EU law on regulating
innovation, which is currently piecemeal and fragmented. In recent months, the
innovation principle has emerged as a key contender for inclusion in the EU Treaties or
at the very least for use as an overall principle in the EU’s regulatory approach.
Although much has been written on innovation, and despite the European
Commission (EC) having assigned it its own Twitter account,1 there is no deﬁnitive,
legal deﬁnition of the word “innovation”. For example, in one EC document innovation
is deﬁned as “change that speeds up and improves the way we conceive, develop,
produce and access new products, industrial processes and services. Changes that create
more jobs, improve people’s lives and build greener and better societies”.2 In another
paper, written by the EC’s European Political Strategy Centre, innovation was recently
deﬁned as “anything new that changes the society adopting it”.3
Of note is that in both papers the deﬁnition refers to “improvement” as well as “better”
societies. This clearly indicates that in the European mind at least, innovation in and of
itself is not a policy goal. Only qualiﬁed innovation is being pursued – innovation that
assists growth, employment, improves peoples’ lives and builds greener and better
societies. Those speaking or publishing about innovation generally prefer not to deﬁne it.
In and of itself this is not necessarily problematic: the precautionary principle, for
instance is not deﬁned at all in the European Treaties, although it is in the accompanying
EC documents.
Scholarship, case law and policy documents on an innovation principle, on the other
hand, are limited due to the relative newness of the proposed principle. This is not to
suggest that the concept has not been seriously considered by various stakeholders at the
EU level. The innovation principle itself was suggested by the European Risk Forum4 in
2013 in a policy document presented by the CEOs of 12 major multinational companies.
The Forum argues that the principle is needed to “provide a new and positive way of
ensuring that policy makers fully recognise social and economic needs for both
precaution and innovation”.5 Further, the EC, conscious that new technologies based on
innovation might present risks to the public interest, has recently coined the idea of
Responsible Research and Innovation. Thus one sees tentative movements from both
industry and policy makers towards shaping a new regulatory approach towards
innovation.
To our mind it will be crucial to ensure that an innovation principle, whatever its
formulation and status, be not employed simply to discredit the achievements of the
precautionary principle in particular. Particularly in industry, an introduction of an
innovation principle would seem to be greeted as an antidote to precaution. Precaution
and innovation are far from mutually exclusive. The European Environment Agency’s
1 @EUScienceInnov, having replaced the earlier @innovationunion on 8 November 2016.
2 European Commission, “Turning Europe into a true Innovation Union”, Memo 10/473 accompanying the
Innovation Union Communication, 6 October 2010.
3 European Political Strategy Centre, “Opportunity now: Europe’s mission to innovate”, 5 July 2016, available at
<https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/ﬁle/strategic-note-15-opportunity-now-europe%E2%80%99s-mission-innovate_en>, last
accessed 2 January 2017.
4 See European Risk Forum, The Innovation Principle – Overview, available at <http://www.riskforum.eu/uploads/
2/5/7/1/25710097/innovation_principle_one_pager_5_march_2015.pdf>, last accessed 2 January 2017.
5 Ibid.
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two reports “Late Lessons from Early Warnings”6 are a reminder that the introduction of
new technologies sometimes can and does go spectacularly wrong.
Finally, all contributors to this issue are, academically speaking, risk averse: for we
can be certain that this discipline that we study will yield plenty of topics in and out of the
boxes which we have outlined above.
6 European Environment Agency, Late Lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896–2000
(Environmental Issue Report No 22/2001), as well as European Environment Agency, Late lessons from early
warnings: science, precaution, innovation (European Environment Agency, Report No 1/2013).
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